The press has recently been speculating over the possible opening of a permanent American military base in Azerbaijan. The Ambassador for the United States in Baku and the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, have both firmly rejected this idea. But whilst the Pentagon prepares to withdraw its troops from Uzbekistan on the request of the Uzbek government, local and foreign observers have wondered about the possibility of moving these American forces to the other side of the Caspian Sea, to Azerbaijan. What is really going on?

This important question also raises others: what should be America’s strategy in Eurasia? This is a issue which has been made more delicate by recent events. Firstly, as the United States were effectively ‘asked’ to leave Uzbekistan, but also because Washington is at present paying particular attention to Iran and the EU3 (Germany, France and Great Britain), the European allies of Tehran.

Today, the priority for Washington is to determine if the US needs to carry out an active policy in Eurasia or if, on the other hand, they should limit their presence to the absolute minimum in order to focus on the Middle East, in particular Iraq, before worrying about Central Asia and Caucasus.

This debate is ongoing in Washington. Many experts have been discussing the subject and have recommended different approaches. However, for as long as this debate remains open and unresolved, I think that the probability of establishing an American military base in Azerbaijan is slim.


Do you think that America has an actual strategy for the South Caucasus, similar to that put into place in Central Asia?

The overseas policy carried out in the South Caucasus primarily aims to maintain relations and cohesion between Georgia and Azerbaijan. Keeping this equilibrium is vital in order to guarantee the security of energy supplies which pass through these territories. The main issue here is oil.

But the links between Georgia and Azerbaijan are fairly open, free from all foreign interference, and this is being maintained, at present, without any American military bases. What’s more, when Georgia negotiated with Russia for the removal of its troops, they guaranteed Moscow that a permanent American base would not be set up in Georgia. Also, if Washington does not set up any base in Georgia, why would it establish one in Azerbaijan?

A permanent American infrastructure in Azerbaijan would only be possible for two reasons. The first centres around any possible serious risk to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. The second depends on Iran: if the United States sees the possibility for an attack on Iran, they could do so from Azeri territory. But for the time being, neither of these two events are applicable or really probable.


At the end of July, the first Russian military convoy left Batumi. The definite withdrawal of the 12th and 62nd Russian military bases is planned only for the end of 2008. In August however, some members of the Russian parliament started to reproach the agreement signed in Moscow. The withdrawal process will probably not be affected. But will the Kremlin be able to come to terms with the departure of their troops from their “close neighbour”?

Russia has assured the United States that they will definitely withdraw their military bases from Georgia. Moscow accepts to withdraw their troops on condition that Georgia keeps a balanced and moderate conduct towards Russia. However, the agreement on the closing of these two Russian military bases does not change in the least the policies imposed by the Kremlin in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Kremlin does not intend to give up its influence on these two secessionist territories. It granted Russian citizenship to thousands of Abkhazians and South Ossetians and now claims that most of these separatist populations are Russians.

This means a de facto annexation of these two separatist republics, which would directly threaten the integrity of the Georgian territory. But this situation is not linked to the withdrawal of the military bases in Georgia. Be that as it may, the representatives in Duma will never exercise any actual authority over the subject if they strive to rail against the departure of the Russian troops in Georgia.

The Kremlin and the Ministry of Defence, the two major political actors with the power to make decisions, concluded that the closing of the two military bases – which are independent one from each other, difficult to defend and supply and too expensive to be maintained - did not mean the end of Russian influence over Georgia, a fortiori over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Moscow also has the Georgian labour force in Russia to its advantage. Therefore, if Moscow closes its frontiers and forbids the Georgians to either work in Russia or to repatriate their income, that would result in a serious setback to Tbilisi. This fact highly increases the power that Moscow has to put pressure on Tbilisi.


You have mentioned what certain issues such as the stability and the security of Georgia and Azerbaijan represent to the United States. Is Armenia being relegated to the background of Washington’s strategic plans concerning the South Caucasus?

Armenia is not located in the Caspian-Black Sea corridor. Besides that, Yerevan is a member of the CSTO (the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, created on 30 April 2003 during the Dushanbe summit and which is largely dominated by Moscow) and they maintain historical and privileged relations with Russia as well as with Iran. All these factors put Armenia aside and out of the enclosed circle of America’s favourite allies in the region.

In addition, Armenia is not only under the influence of South Caucasian geo-political realities, but also under that of a very powerful pro-Armenia lobby group in the US. Therefore, the relations between Washington and Yerevan are more bilateral than integrated and interdependent of American strategies in the region.

When it comes to this subject, the Nagorno-Karabakh project is of major importance. American diplomats are optimistic and have been working hard to put an end to the Yerevan-Baku conflict. This process might end sooner or later and only then will it be possible to integrate Armenia into the strategy concerning the region.

But so far among the American priorities, the main objective in Washington has been to settle the process created under the aegis of the Minsk group, and to develop bilateral relations with Yerevan in order to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and support non-governmental relations between Azeris and Armenians. Examples of these efforts of popular democracy for the resolution of conflicts can sometimes be observed in Georgia. From now on, they should work on that direction to re-establish relations between Armenians and Azeris.