As expected, the initiative of the Georgian and Ukrainian presidents worries Moscow, who is already finding it difficult to maintain its sphere of influence within the Community of Independent States thought to be a lost cause or, at least, incapable of modernising itself. In the United States, the Bush administration, draped in its “moral stance” of promoting the values of freedom and democracy, has welcomed the programme for democratisation with enthusiasm. Brussels, on the other hand, prefers to err on the side of caution because of the key importance that lies in the strategic partnership between the European Union and Russia. This is a clear priority, which is carried out at the expense of a European policy that is still inexistent in the Black Sea area and one that is cautious in the South Caucasus, where Russian and European neighbourhoods overlap and lie at the heart of the problem.
In an aside, the comments of some diplomats and observers are ambivalent and this, beyond the first policy statements, raises questions. Firstly, because the Borjomi Declaration defines the emergence of a new organisation whose powers remain unclear. Will discussions lead to a precise agenda and clearly defined objectives? The first initiative of forming a counterweight to the control of the Kremlin over the post-Soviet area was the creation in 1997 of GUAM, a group that is today crippled by its incapacity to apply a common policy. Will the situation be different for the Community of Democratic Choice?
While still only theoretical limited to speechmaking, the new regional alliance already c_arries the stigmata of both a remarkable feat and a complete waste of effort. This dichotomy could prove to be either a democratic window embodying the ideals of multicolour revolutions or, on the other hand, the emergence of a coalition equipped with objectives and the means aimed at achieving Euro-Atlantic integration. It could also be a dichotomy of the emergence of a new geopolitical group along the Black Sea, raising questions about the legitimacy of a Community of Democratic Choice which could be seen as yet another alliance, but also as one too many. It is unclear what direction this new organisation will take given the existence of several other regional alliaances, which are often criticised for their lack of action.
There are also doubts surrounding the ability of the Georgian and Ukrainian heads of state to keep this structure afloat. Even with unconditional support from the United States, how can an economically weak state, such as Georgia, whose boundaries have been rendered uncertain by the presence of frozen conflicts and its lack of legitimacy in its regions, have the means to pursue its ambitions?
The democracy presented with pride by Saakashvili to a benevolent international public is coloured by uncertainty within national borders. Proof of this uncertainty are the latest events on the domestic political scene in Georgia (the recent dismissal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Salomé Zourabichvili who has condemned the clans in power for their corruption), and the recurring warnings of NGOs regarding press freedom violations. The only thing that is guaranteed are the reforms promised in 2003 during the “Revolution of the Roses”, but these will be a long and especially fragile process. It remains to be seen whether the Georgian government can focus on other projects other than that democracy-building on Georgian soil.
CONTENTS
Regional Alliances
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The Community of Democratic Choice: a brilliant PR coup?
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An elixir of youth for regional cooperation in the Black Sea basin
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A threat to the CIS?
The Community of Democratic Choice seen from Brussels
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The European Union is feeling its way in the Black Sea
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Interview with Javier Solana - ‘’The European Neighbourhood Policy is not a policy aimed at EU enlargement; it neither foresees it nor excludes it’’
Georgia, an emergent regional power?
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Georgia throws a smokescreen before our eyes