Why has the EU not taken too much of an interest thus far in cooperation initiatives in the Black Sea region such as GUAM and the BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation), given that the candidate EU member states Bulgaria and Romania and the aspiring candidate Turkey are already BSEC members?

The reason why the EU hasn’t shown a very strong interest in GUAM or BSEC is that these organizations are not seen as providing any sort of added value.
Many of the policies on which BSEC member states are trying to cooperate don’t make sense from an EU perspective. In trade policy terms, for example, BSEC cannot have common policies, because BSEC member states have such different relationships with the WTO. Furthermore, it is actually impossible for the BSEC to have a free trade area, because the EU has a common trade policy and some BSEC member states are either accession candidates or actually EU member states. If the BSEC wants the EU to take it more seriously, the BSEC should take itself more seriously.

However, one of the reasons why the EU should get more involved is because the BSEC provides a forum where countries, which have difficult bilateral relationships and are not on speaking terms like Turkey and Armenia or Armenia and Azerbaijan, can actually talk to each other. But this is not enough for the EU. If the Commission is supposed to get involved, BSEC has to come up with something substantial.

Nevertheless, the BSEC is making itself more and more relevant to the European Union by emphasizing cooperation, which is not focused on economics and trade. The BSEC has come up with a number of agreements and initiatives on visa facilitation, transport networks, organized crime and a stronger emphasis on security issues. These are areas where the European Commission actually has power to act. Those initiatives are very complementary to what the EU itself wants in the Black Sea. It is in the EU’s own interests for all of these countries to cooperate.


How is regional cooperation addressed within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy?

The new assistance instrument ENPI (European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument) is much more conducive to Black Sea cooperation than it was before. In the past, the BSEC member states were targeted by different instruments (PHARE, TACIS, INTERREG) and coordination was very difficult. The new instrument functions on all sides of the border, regardless of what categories the countries are in relationship to the EU.

However, the principle of differentiation means that the EU deals with all of these countries bilaterally. In one sense, this arises from practical considerations, because it is a much easier configuration for the EU. A regional approach, where countries would depend on each other, means that certain countries would be given a veto for their relationship between the EU and other countries. If regional cooperation became a condition for cooperating with the EU, suddenly Russia would have a veto on Georgia, or Armenia on Turkey and vice versa. Furthermore, the EU wants to be able to reward countries that are moving in the direction that the EU would like by fulfilling the criteria of market reforms, democracy and rule of law.


Is the EU wary of alliances between post-Communist states that might upset Russia with repercussions on the EU-Russia partnership? What are the reactions so far to the “Saakashvili-Yushchenko alliance of democracies”?

Given that Russia is a big player, the EU needs Russia. Most EU member states don’t want to antagonize Russia. As a consequence, the EU doesn’t want to be too encouraging of this kind of alliances, but doesn’t want to be discouraging either, so the EU is engaging in a kind of a balancing act.

The fact that new EU member states have different views from the older members changes the overall EU approach to the region. However, disagreements on the policy to adopt with the “neighbours” have always existed. Traditionally, Nordic countries, Great Britain and the Netherlands to some extent were always more concerned about liberal values, democracy and the rule of law, while the older bigger member states have more a geopolitical approach to the region. Nonetheless, divisions have become more prominent with the enlargement.

The reaction so far to the “Saakashvili-Yuchshenko alliance of democracies” is more wary, because this alliance seems to be very much like an attempt to play geopolitical diplomacy. Saakashvili and Yuchshenko haven’t put any specific plans or projects on the table. For this reason, the BSEC is more interesting than GUAM or the “Baltic-Black Sea alliance of democracies”.

Considering what the BSEC has done recently and the direction in which it is moving, it is about time that the EU responds a bit more positively now. It will be interesting to see how Black Sea cooperation develops when Bulgaria and Romania are actually members of the EU. There is a difference between being a candidate on the doorstep of membership and being an actual EU member state and this difference can be felt in the Eastern policy of the new members. Having focused completely on EU and NATO accession for the last ten years, Bulgaria and Romania have basically neglected their Black Sea and Eastern dimension. Now, Romanian President Basescu has said that Romania is going to refocus eastwards. We will see how Brussels is going to respond to these new members.