Is Georgia an emerging regional power? One would say the question is becoming an assertion on many Western political experts’ lips when mentioning the Regional Alliance of Democratic Nations. Do you share this widespread opinion among Western experts, but not so widespread in the South Caucasus?
More precisely, is the real reason for new Georgia’s geopolitical part based on this very situation, ie, on the fact that Georgia is the only Caucasian state which seems to pursue a proactive and independent foreign policy, as exemplified in its relations with both some of its neighbors and great powers?

In principle, I am skeptical. If any country is developing into an emerging regional power it is clearly not Georgia, but Azerbaijan. Actually, I would say that neither is a regional power at this point. Georgia’s only claim to status is its Rose Revolution, and its progressive reform process. However, this is not enough. President Saakashvili remains popular although less than before, and the reform process is slowing.

Externally he may be an icon of democracy, but the enormous expectations created by Saakashvili remain far from being anything close to being fulfilled. Georgia will again face energy shortages this winter, exemplifying the difficulties in the country. The Georgian government pursues an inconsistent policy on its two territorial conflicts, and in general there seems to be little long-term strategic framework for the government’s policies, whether external or internal. This is not to belittle the progress made since the Rose Revolution, which is significant and visible to any visitor to Georgia, but Georgia needs to focus on its own state-building, reforms, and consolidation of the newly-won democracy before anyone can start speaking of a putative role as a regional power.

Moreover, relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan have suffered in the past year, further reducing any claims to regional power status. Besides, Georgia remains a very weak State and strongly dependent on the U.S., and is not an independent player in foreign policy terms. As I have said, if there is any country developing into having an independent foreign policy, it is Azerbaijan, which tries to balance its relations with the major powers in the region without being dependent on any single one. Its stronger economy and stronger statehood also make Azerbaijan a stronger power than Georgia.


As a matter of fact, Georgia is not so populated, maybe also not so popular, and still has trouble reforming its economy. If its role as a crucial geopolitical pivot is confirmed, is Georgia not taking the risk of being too greedy or ambitious? Isn’t there a risk of wanting to run before it can walk ?

Exactly. My answer above addresses this point. Aspiring to a regional power status, which I’m not even sure Georgia is seeking, would only be detrimental to Georgia as it is unrealistic and is also deflecting attention from the main priorities at hand, building the state and moving on with the reform process before the government runs out of steam and Saakashvili runs out of popularity. Let’s avoid megalomania here, and it is up to western experts not to entertain or fuel such ideas. Trying to launch this idea in fact is counterproductive to Georgia’s most pressing national interests.


Why did Georgia choose or need Kiev as a partner to carry out this alliance ?Couldn't it carry out it on its own or with another partner?

Well, the entire idea stems from the friendship of Saakashvili and Yushchenko and is based on their being the leaders of coloured revolutions. Why did Georgia need Kiev? What could Georgia do alone? Or which other partner could it have chosen? Nobody.


Isn’t leading a new regional alliance with Ukraine a way for Georgia to turn its back a little more on Azerbaijan and Armenia? And consequently, to fragilize the still-cautious development of South Caucasian transregional dynamics ?

Yes, of course. But this has been a constant tendency on the part of the Georgian leadership. Once the Rose revolution was over, the Georgian leadership was tempted to see itself as no longer belonging, at least in political terms, to the Caucasus, trying instead to somehow transpose itself into an eastern European or ‘Black Sea’ country and so to speak to think of itself as somewhat better than its two neighbors. In a sense, there has been a hint of arrogance among some members of the Georgian leadership.

This is not necessarily in Georgia’s interests, especially considering its Euro-Atlantic integration. Georgia will remain a part of the South Caucasus, and especially for NATO, it remains a part of that strategic environment. Hence trying to ‘escape’ the Caucasus is unlikely to help. Relations with Azerbaijan, crucial to Georgia’s security, have already suffered from this lack of attention to the reality of Georgia’s strategic location.


Lately, in Kazan, Saakashvili denied speculation that deepening of bilateral ties between Georgia and Ukraine is a precondition to create an alternative to the CIS. “This will not replace the CIS. Georgia’s withdrawal from the CIS is not on the agenda”. Is it all a bluff? In creating this Democratic Community, from the Baltic to the Caspian Seas, do Saakashvili and Yushchenko unavoidably face the Commonwealth of Independent States and weaken Russian influence in the area?

It may not be a bluff, since everyone, including Saakashvili, is unlikely to break formally with the CIS. Instead, it is much easier to let a dysfunctional organization self-destruct. This avoids provoking Moscow, and instead one can spend time on building novel constructions. This was the idea with GUUAM all along, and the new initiative could be said to be a new variation on the theme of GUUAM, that moves a little more to the west and north.


Do you think going against the CIS current means moving on the royal path of future integration within the European Union and NATO?

I think it is a natural development. The CIS was never going to work because it was constructed as a vehicle for Russian continued domination of the former USSR. The weakening of the CIS is as much a consequence as a cause of the movement toward Euro-Atlantic structures on the part of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, even Armenia, as well as some Central Asian states.


Within the framework of other existing regional alignments and alliances (like GUAM, or the Russia-Armenia-Iran-Syria axis parallel to the alignment of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Israel and the United States), up to which point can the Regional Alliance of Democratic Nations find its place, ie, an efficient and relevant one?


So far, it is unlikely to form an efficient and relevant structure as it is still very unclear what following it will receive, what mandate it will have, if it will prove to be more than a series of bilateral exchanges. It is important as it is, after GUAM, the only voluntary initiative taken by states in the region to pursue their own interests and not as the CIS, Shanghai group, or CSTO a vehicle of great powers. But it will take a lot more investment – which GUAM failed to provide – and a clear perceived added value to the member states for this to become a serious initiative.


Finally, is the future course of Georgia’s policies (interior, regional, international) of real great importance to the security of the Caucasus?

Of course, Georgia’s stability is crucial to the security of the entire Caucasus. It has been the case for years, and will remain so. Both Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the West are interested in a stable Georgia for their security. Even some circles in Russia are beginning to realize this.