According to press releases published in Germany in April 2006, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel would like to place the Caucasus, a region rich in energy resources, at the heart of the political preoccupations during the German presidency of the European Union (EU). The newspaper Die Welt mentioned in March a “European policy offensive towards the Caucasus” that the Chancellor would like to initiate. What is your opinion of these statements? Does this signal a new European policy towards the East?

These press releases were erroneous if they gave the impression that a “European offensive towards the Caucasus” would come under the purview of the German presidency of the EU. These statements were published before a speech made by the Chancellor before the Bundestag on May 11, where Ms. Merkel discussed, inter alia, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).

After a year of hesitation, the EU finally included the three states of the South Caucasus on its agenda regarding its Neighborhood policy in July 2004. Thus, the start of a “new EU policy towards the East” in the direction of the Caucasus and other frontier zones between Russia and Europe lies in the years 2003-2004, when the ENP was outlined.

The policy was at first reluctant to address the Caucasus. Then, in 2004, Brussels decided to add this region to the ENP, after also including the North African states. In addition to the peaceful transfer of power in Georgia, the status of the Caucasus as a transportation corridor and as a supplier of energy resources, and security problems in the region were the catalysts for this reversal of policy. Germany revealed itself as an important advocate for the political enlargement of the Neighborhood policy to the South Caucasus. However, with regard to the German presidency of the EU in 2007, Central Asia actually occupies a more central place on the agenda of European foreign policy.


Whereas within the EU, debate is more and more focused on the diversification of energy supplies, GUAM has pleaded for reinforced cooperation on energy issues with the EU. Will Brussels pay more attention to these initiatives and support alternative ways of energy transport?

The diversification of energy resources is a theme in European and German policy that will gain considerable weight this year. In this context, the Caspian basin and the surrounding regions will draw more and more attention.

One should, however, be wary of exaggerated or over-publicized hopes, such as the idea of the Caspian region (Central Asia and Azerbaijan) as the “Gulf of the 21st Century.” This area is far from being able to match the level of the Gulf region or to reach the energy richness of Russia. With 4-5% of the world’s reserves in oil and gas, in spite of everything, it represents a certain stake in the diversification of Europe’s energy policy and the policies of other energy consumers, notably China.

The Caucasus is viewed as a transit corridor to Europe as well as an energy producer, as in the case of Azerbaijan. On the other hand, in the past Europe has been less engaged than the United States in the layout of pipelines oriented towards West, like the BTC pipeline.

With regard to GUAM, it remains to be seen whether energy interests can lead to closer cooperation among its members. Until now, GUAM had belonged more to the spheres of integration in post-Soviet space, which have been practically stripped of substance on the level of cooperation. An unknown factor remains: the convergence of energy policy between countries like the Ukraine and Azerbaijan—which could change the character of GUAM and be synonymous with more concrete, interactive cooperation.


The EU Special Representative to the Caucasus, Peter Semneby, has expressed a reinforced interest in the EU for conflict resolution in the South Caucasus. To what extent can the energy question effectively stimulate European involvement in the Caucasus? Is the EU ready to more effectively push for territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of the countries of the South Caucasus?

As European policy began to intensify in the Caucasus—that is to say, in 2001-2002, the underlying conflicts in the South Caucasus were viewed as the principal source of political, economic, and security problems in the region, as well as a challenge to the Caucasian foreign policy. For a long time it has been said that EU support can only be made effective if two conditions are met: the peaceful resolution of conflicts and regional cooperation.

However, this political discourse does not correspond to the reality on the ground. The EU has not developed a strategy for its active participation in conflict resolution. In this case, it referred to the role that other international and regional organizations like the OSCE and the UN have played in conflict resolution in the region. It hardly showed its presence in the mechanisms of negotiation in three cases of conflict—Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and High-Karabakh—except her support of the OSCE in South Ossetia.

After the integration of the South Caucasus in the ENP, the place of conflicts in the European political discourse has been reinforced. However, on this ground, the EU has remained reserved. One can only expect possible EU participation in building “bridges” among the civilian actors in zones of conflict, in building confidence, and in supporting economic rehabilitation programs in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A study from the International Crisis Group has described this approach by the words “Working around rather than on conflict”.

Already in the ENP country reports for the South Caucasus, indications on regional conflicts have remained rather vague—in contrast to the case of Moldova, where the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict has been defined as one of the principal priorities. Similarly, in the outline of the action plans for the South Caucasus countries, the Commission has emphasized other aspects: democratization, the protection of human rights, legislative reform. It is also on this last theme that the European Rule-of-Law Mission in Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS) is engaged—at this time, the only European initiative in the South Caucasus region.

I believe that one should not expect effective European involvement in conflict resolution in the South Caucasus. However, there will be solid reasons for real engagement. Not only because of Europe’s energy interests but, more importantly, in its interest in stable neighbors. In effect, the principal objective of the European Neighborhood Policy is the establishment of stable frontiers on the periphery of Europe—the Caucasus is truly one of the particularly unstable regions on the borders of Europe and marked by conflict.


Can the EU allow itself enter into a strategic game with Russia in the Caucasus region? Can the European states reinforce their strategic and political presence in the Caucasus without finding themselves embarking on direct confrontation with Russia?

The EU fears being seen by Russia as a “geopolitical adversary” in post-Soviet space. But, on this point, the 25 member-states do not represent a unified front. In their attitudes towards Russia and the CIS, there are differences in perception and in action between the new Baltic and Central European member-states on one hand, and the original 15 member-states on the other. The new member-states like the Baltic States plead for a stronger approach in the South Caucasus and in its regional conflicts. In Berlin and in other capitals, leaders worry about Moscow’s possible reaction to a real approach.

The impression that in the Caucasus nothing can prevent a confrontation with Russia is certainly real. But can this view of things prevent Europe from establishing a more critical dialogue with Russia, since a clear engagement for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states like Georgia actually represents a European interest which goes beyond pure rhetoric? For example, concerning Russia, there exist fundamentally different approaches to the secessionist conflicts on both sides of the Caucasus Mountains. At the same time it will rest upon the EU the role of having a moderating effect on Georgia, which, with its principal political objective being the reestablishment of its territorial integrity, may act unwisely and in ways that may favor the escalation of tensions.