From Palestine to Georgia and from Lebanon to Azerbaijan the spectre of wars in the European neighbourhood is ever more apparent. In the South Caucasus the status quo is untenable, Russia is more assertive, Azerbaijan and Georgia are militarising and tensions rise almost daily. The EU sees all that, but fails to act. The EU response to such developments has been less, not more commitment to the ENP. The EU South Caucasus policy is just one example.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia

The European Security Strategy (ESS) states that it ‘is in the European interest that countries on the EU’s borders are well-governed’ because, ‘neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, [and] dysfunctional societies…all pose problems for Europe.’ The South Caucasus was also explicitly mentioned in the European Security Strategy as an area where the EU should take a “stronger and more active interest.” Thus, by 2006 the EU has developed a certain profile in the complicated web of conflicts in the South Caucasus.

The EU has been a player in conflict resolution efforts around the secessionist areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. Since 1997 the EU has been financing the rehabilitation of the conflict zones in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. EU assistance for these regions amounted to 33 million Euros between 1997 and 2005. From 2006, the EU significantly increased its budget and became the biggest international donor in the conflict regions.

In its policies towards the conflicts in Georgia, the EU prioritized South Ossetia. This happened for a number of reasons. Firstly, there is a widespread feeling that the South Ossetia conflict is easier to solve. Second, unlike in Abkhazia, a solution in South Ossetia is perceived as being more important and more urgent to efforts to build a sustainable, functioning and democratic Georgia. At the end of the day, South Ossetia is some 100 km from Tbilisi. Thus, the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus (EUSR) has had a more hands-on approach to South Ossetia, while the European Commission has been participating in economic-related issues discussed in the Joint Control Commission (JCC) which brings together Georgia, South Ossetians and Russia (including North Ossetia).

Despite elements of engagement, the EU chose not to play too large a role in conflict resolution issues in Georgia. The EU chose to focus on Georgia’s reform and transformation instead, which is seen as a precondition for settling the conflicts. In 2004-2005 the EU deployed a one year long “rule of law” mission to Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS), and in 2005 a team of experts was deployed to support border reform. The recently finalised EU-Georgia neighbourhood policy action plan is consistent with such a “Georgia first” approach. Rather than conflict resolution, the Action Plan’s first priorities are rule of law and improving the investment climate. The EU approach is entirely justified. Most political and economic reforms in Georgia can (and should) be undertaken without holding them hostage to the unsolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In any case, the conflicts cannot be solved without an attractive, prosperous, democratic and Europeanised Georgia.

However, even the EU’s focus on Georgia has been half-hearted. The EU failed to deploy a requested EU border monitoring mission in 2005 to replace an OSCE Border Monitoring Operation which was terminated by Russia. And the EU-Georgia action plan fails to offer any of the modest incentives which were offered to Moldova and Ukraine such as visa facilitation deals, a more or less clear perspective for “deep and comprehensive free trade” or the opportunity to align with all EU foreign policy statements.

Nagorno-Karabakh

The EU policy towards the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh which pits Azerbaijan and Armenia against each other has been even more modest. Nagorno-Karabakh is the most dangerous and important conflict in the South Caucasus. The likelihood that the conflict will degenerate into war is the highest in the region, and this unsolved conflict is the most serious obstacle to regional stability and cooperation. It is also the greatest impediment to whatever hopes there are to transform the South Caucasus into a transportation hub between East, West, North and South. Despite these factors, the EU is even less involved in supporting conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh than it is involved in the Abkhaz and South Ossetian issues.

Unlike in other post-Soviet conflicts such as Transnistria (Moldova), Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EU is not even a demandeur for a greater role in the conflict settlement process in Nagorno-Karabakh. The official position of the EU is that it would consider a contribution to peace keeping forces in the region if and only if there is agreement between the parties on the deployment of such forces. This is not to say that Europe’s voice in not heard in the Nagorno-Karabakh case. France, along with Russia and the US, co-chairs the OSCE Minsk Group which mediates in Nagorno-Karabakh.

However, the EU is not involved in the rehabilitation of the conflict zone, and it applies neither clear pressures nor incentives to push the conflict resolution process forward. The EU is careful to stay neutral in the broader debates between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The EU is opposed to the Turkish and Azerbaijani blockade of Armenia, while also being careful to remain in cooperative relations with Azerbaijan. While the EU Action Plan with Azerbaijan bluntly supports the principal of states’ territorial integrity, the EU-Armenia Action Plan supports the principle of self-determination. In other words the EU has little if any policy towards the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

EU’s constrained engagement

All of these hesitant EU policies are the result of an unclear balance of reasons for and constraints upon action in the South Caucasus.

The most important reasons for greater EU involvement are as follows. First, with the launch of ENP and the development of a European Security and Defence Policy, the EU has not only the reasons, but also the instruments necessary for involvement in conflict resolution. Second, the broader success of the ENP depends to a certain extent on progress towards the settlement of the conflicts. The EU cannot just ignore these conflicts. Third, the South Caucasus is one of the very few energy transit corridors that can allow the EU to diversify access to energy resources from the Caspian region. The current energy-related hysteria in international relations focuses attention on the South Caucasus as a transit region as well. The three possible alternative gas transit routes from the Caspian Sea to the EU – the Nabucco, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum and the trans-Black Sea pipeline projects all depend on stability in the South Caucasus.

But while the reasons for a greater EU role are compelling, the constraints are formidable. First, the EU has many competing priorities. The Balkans and the Middle East are geographically closer to the EU than the South Caucasus. At the same time due to continuing bloodshed in these regions, sub-Saharan Africa, Afghanistan and Sudan are perceived as more urgent than the South Caucasus. And, unlike in the Balkans, there is no general consensus in the EU that the South Caucasus is an urgent matter. Second, EU foreign and security capacities are already strained. From budgetary issues, to the availability of military and civilian personnel, the EU is overburdened with ESDP missions. Third, the EU has a preference of getting involved in conflicts where it can make a difference, i.e. conflicts which would be potentially solvable. The South Caucasus conflicts do not seem solvable in the foreseeable future. Additionally, Russia’s opposition to EU involvement is not helpful.

Making the ENP real

The EU’s policies in the South Caucasus are not the result of the ENP. The appointment of the EUSR, significant EU financial support to the conflict areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and EU participation in the JCC in South Ossetia all predate the launch of ENP. The ENP has brought little change, and the Action Plans are not necessarily a road map for greater EU involvement.

The EU’s desired focus on shaping the environment in the Eastern neighbourhood lacks real readiness to offer even the most basic and short term of ENP promises. It took almost three years to launch twinning and TAIEX (technical assistance and information exchange offices) programs for the EU’s neighbours. A visa facilitation deal is almost concluded with Ukraine, but will take another two years to take effect, and in any case, it will affect only a small percent of Ukrainian citizens. Trade liberalisation, while on offer in principle, has not been seriously discussed for those products that truly matter for the EU’s Eastern neighbours. EU assistance to its South Mediterranean neighbours is still approximately twice as high per capita than for its eastern neighbours. The opening of Erasmus student exchange programs for the EU’s Eastern neighbours has been stalled. Since 2004, for example, only 14 Moldovan students had an Erasmus Mundus scholarship. The EU still seems not to realise that an effective foreign policy implies political and economic costs.

The argument that the South Caucasus is not ready for a deeper relationship with the EU is not true. It is the EU that is not ready to engage more deeply with the South Caucasus and its neighbourhood in general. Certainly, the EU cannot and need not commit thousands of peacekeepers and invest billions into the conflict areas of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. This is unrealistic. But the EU should first and foremost take its earlier promises to its neighbours seriously. Proper implementation of the ENP is more important than more EU promises under an ENP+ or Ostpolitik. In addition the EU should think creatively on how to involve the secessionist entities into some economic, educational and maybe political aspects of the ENP. This would allow the EU to use its “soft power” instruments better, while shaping the environment of the conflicts in the whole of the South Caucasus. In this region the EU should better remember its own policy mantra that conflict prevention is cheaper and more effective than conflict resolution. Failing to act today in the South Caucasus will not be without consequences tomorrow.