The 29 March meeting of EU Troika – Central Asia foreign ministers was a significant event above all for the symbolic unity demonstrated by representatives of the five Central Asian nations in Astana. Never before have the foreign ministers of Central Asian states with diverse and largely ill-defined economic and political goals met together to discuss such a globally important issue as energy cooperation with the European Union.

In Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan with its multifaceted foreign policy, the EU faces new challenges. Kazakhstan’s close relationship with China is a fait accompli which has to be accepted if possibilities of altering it are not at hand. However Kazakhstan’s incessant attempts to diversify its energy transportation routes in order to minimize its dependency on Russian pipelines are an encouraging development for the EU's energy strategy in Central Asia.

Would German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier deign to come to wind-swept Astana if it were not for the gas row last year between Belarus, Ukraine and Russia that shattered Europe's illusion of energy security? That is the question most-asked by analysts in Kazakhstan these days. The popular opinion, which is zealously supported by pro-Russian officials, is that in the current difficult situation, European nations suffering energy shortages need Kazakhstan more than the other way around. EU member-countries' vulnerability to a looming energy crisis takes the wind out of Western sails in the long-running argument about human rights and democratic standards.

Energy interests overshadow the human rights agenda

The most salient view which is common to all Central Asian leaders is the deep-rooted reluctance to accept any new standards which may threaten regime security and alter their time-tested authoritarian methods of governance. Askar Shomanov, acting director of the Institute of World Politics and head of the analytical centre of Nazarbayev's administration, reiterated this view. Speaking at a 13 March conference on security issues in Central Asia which was held in Almaty under the aegis of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, he said that alien models of governance imposed by outside forces could not be embraced by the population.

No wonder that in a country invariably showcased by Western policy makers as a bulwark of economic stability and social harmony, the majority of the population visualizes the ruling regime as a perfect safe haven to be protected against the threat of a colour revolution.

To many outside observers government officials' efforts to reconcile age-old authoritarian rule with new democratic challenges may seem to be successful. Broadly speaking, in comparison with Uzbekistan which has been ostracized by the West for the Andijan massacre or turbulent Kyrgyzstan and impoverished Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan is a better place for democracy to prosper.

Apparently, the EU attaches much hope to some of the positive developments in Kazakhstan such as budding judicial reform, a comparatively good human rights records and efforts to amend the media law and to protect the rights of ethnic minorities.

It is hardly surprising that European democratic institutions carefully avoid harsh language when addressing Kazakh authorities even in cases of obvious violations of democratic norms. When independent journalist Kazis Toguzbayev was given two-year suspended sentence last January for allegedly infringing upon the honour of the president, the EU limited its protest to a mildly worded statement. The mysterious deaths of political figures and journalists Zamanbek Nurkadilov, Altynbek Sarsenbayev, Askhat Sharipzhanov, Batyrkhan Darimbet and Nuri Muftakh went almost unnoticed by the international community.

Behind the façade

Central Asian countries know that Western policy makers put business before politics when it deals with the energy-rich region. Frank-Walter Steinmeier was no exception in that respect. His counterparts from Central Asia eagerly discussed energy cooperation, but his calls for human rights and rule of law in the region fell largely on deaf ears. Turkmenistan’s foreign minister did not appear for the joint press-conference. Vladimir Norov, foreign minister of Uzbekistan could not conceal his irritation, saying that his country would not tolerate any outside interference.

The authoritarian regimes' cool reaction to the political components of the EU's strategy in Central Asia clearly shows that the political reform efforts the EU has undertaken in recent years, including Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s five-nation trip to the region last November, have not produced palpable results.

Even more discouraging is the fact that few bother to ponder what positive impact the more than 1 billion euros the EU has funnelled into Central Asia's black hole has had on the rural population's living standards. The much-trumpeted campaign launched by the Kazakh government to stamp out corruption looks more like a red herring aimed at creating an illusion of transparency than a genuine intention to purge government offices of top-level bribe takers and multi-million euro embezzlers of public funds. In Kazakhstan only small-time crooks and low-ranking public servants are sent to jail while the real string-pullers in Astana or in regional governments go unpunished.

The wall of alienation between society and the government and plummeting public confidence in the authorities' integrity are potential sources of trouble in Kazakhstan that may undermine the EU's strategy in the region. As long as press freedom is curtailed at the local and regional level and European monitors see nothing beyond Astana and Almaty, nothing will change for the better.

In the future, the EU will have to contribute substantially to the settlement of border conflicts in the region, particularly between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, if it wishes to have long-term partners and law-governed states in Central Asia. Shots along the Kazakh-Uzbek border are almost daily occurrences.

Central Asia as a bridge between the EU and Russia?

Arriving with an attractive energy cooperation scheme including the Odessa-Brody-Gdansk oil pipeline project, Polish President Lech Kaczyñski's visit to Astana in the wake of the EU Troika was more welcome than that of the German foreign minister. The visit was further sweetened by Polish support for Kazakhstan’s coveted OSCE chairmanship in 2009 and a voiced intention to draw Kazakhstan into mediation between the EU and Russia.

However, Germany's strategy for Central Asia will also bear fruit if efforts are continued. NATO’s individual partnership program for Kazakhstan, Kazakh peacekeeping forces' performance in Iraq and Kazakhstan’s humanitarian and technical assistance to Afghanistan could serve as a solid foundation to promote similar cooperation with other Central Asian nations.

Each of the five nations has a role to play in bridging the differences between Russia and the EU on the one hand and the Western and Muslim world on the other hand. To achieve that goal the EU should clearly define the political dimensions of its strategy for the region.